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ABSTRACT
We study the problem of defending deep neural network approaches for image
classification from physically realizable attacks. First, we demonstrate that the
two most scalable and effective methods for learning robust models, adversarial
training with PGD attacks and randomized smoothing, exhibit very limited effec-
tiveness against three of the highest profile physical attacks. Next, we propose
a new abstract adversarial model, rectangular occlusion attacks, in which an ad-
versary places a small adversarially crafted rectangle in an image, and develop
two approaches for efficiently computing the resulting adversarial examples. Fi-
nally, we demonstrate that adversarial training using our new attack yields image
classification models that exhibit high robustness against the physically realizable
attacks we study, offering the first effective generic defense against such attacks.
1 INTRODUCTION
State-of-the-art effectiveness of deep neural networks has made it the technique of choice in a variety
of fields, including computer vision (He et al., 2016), natural language processing, (Sutskever et al.,
2014) and speech recognition (Hinton et al., 2012). However, there have been a myriad of demon-
strations showing that deep neural networks can be easily fooled by carefully perturbing pixels in
an image through what have become known as adversarial example attacks (Szegedy et al., 2014;
Goodfellow et al., 2015; Carlini & Wagner, 2017b; Vorobeychik & Kantarcioglu, 2018). In response,
a large literature has emerged on defending deep neural networks against adversarial examples, typ-
ically either proposing techniques for learning more robust neural network models (Wong & Kolter,
2018; Wong et al., 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018b; Cohen et al., 2019; Madry et al., 2018), or by
detecting adversarial inputs (Metzen et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2018).
Particularly concerning, however, have been a number of demonstrations that implement adversarial
perturbations directly in physical objects that are subsequently captured by a camera, and then fed
through the deep neural network classifier (Boloor et al., 2019; Eykholt et al., 2018; Athalye et al.,
2018b; Brown et al., 2018). Among the most significant of such physical attacks on deep neural
networks are three that we specifically consider here: 1) the attack which fools face recognition
by using adversarially designed eyeglass frames (Sharif et al., 2016), 2) the attack which fools
stop sign classification by adding adversarially crafted stickers (Eykholt et al., 2018), and 3) the
universal adversarial patch attack, which causes targeted misclassification of any object with the
adversarially designed sticker (patch) (Brown et al., 2018). Oddly, while considerable attention has
been devoted to defending against adversarial perturbation attacks in the digital space, there are no
effective methods specifically to defend against such physical attacks.
Our first contribution is an empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of conventional approaches to
robust ML against two physically realizable attacks: the eyeglass frame attack on face recogni-
tion (Sharif et al., 2016) and the sticker attack on stop signs (Eykholt et al., 2018). Specifically, we
study the performance on adversarial training and randomized smoothing against these attacks, and
show that both are largely ineffective in this context, despite showing moderate effectiveness against
l∞ and l2 attacks, respectively.
Our second contribution is a novel abstract attack model which more directly captures the nature
of common physically realizable attacks than the conventional lp-based models. Specifically, we
consider a simple class of rectangular occlusion attacks in which the attacker places a rectangular
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sticker onto an image, with both the location and the content of the sticker adversarially chosen. We
develop several algorithms for computing such adversarial occlusions, and use adversarial training
to obtain neural network models that are robust to these. We then use an extensive experimental
evaluation to demonstrate that our proposed approach is far more robust against physical attacks
on deep neural networks than adversarial training and randomized smoothing methods that leverage
lp-based attack models.
RelatedWork While many approaches for defending deep learning in vision applications have been
proposed, robust learning methods have been particularly promising, since alternatives are often de-
feated soon after being proposed (Madry et al., 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018a; Wong & Kolter,
2018; Vorobeychik & Kantarcioglu, 2018). The standard solution approach for this problem is an
adaptation of Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) where gradients are either with respect to the loss
at the optimal adversarial perturbation for each i (or approximation thereof, such as using heuristic
local search (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2018) or a convex over-approximation (Raghu-
nathan et al., 2018b; Wang et al., 2018)), or with respect to the dual of the convex relaxation of
the attacker maximization problem (Raghunathan et al., 2018a; Wong & Kolter, 2018; Wong et al.,
2018). Despite these advances, adversarial training a la Madry et al. (2018) remains the most prac-
tically effective method for hardening neural networks against adversarial examples with l∞-norm
perturbation constraints. Recently, randomized smoothing emerged as another class of techniques
for obtaining robustness (Lecuyer et al., 2019; Cohen et al., 2019), with strongest results in the con-
text of l2-norm attacks. In addition to training neural networks that are robust by construction, a
number of methods study the problem of detecting adversarial examples Metzen et al. (2017); Xu
et al. (2018), with mixed results Carlini & Wagner (2017a). Of particular interest is recent work on
detecting physical adversarial examples Chou et al. (2018). However, detection is inherently weaker
than robustness, which is our goal, as even perfect detection does not resolve the question of how to
make decisions on adversarial examples.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES IN THE DIGITAL AND PHYSICAL WORLD
Since the original adversarial example attacks on deep learning for image classification by Szegedy
et al. (2014) and Goodfellow et al. (2015) demonstrated that adversarial perturbations that are es-
sentially invisible to the human eye can cause systematic misclassification by state-of-the-art neural
networks, there have been a myriad of follow up studies. In the vast majority of this literature, the
focus is on algorithmic approaches for identifying a perturbation δ to add to an original input image
x to cause a misclassification while remaining “suspicious”, where suspiciousness is quantified by
an lp-norm constraint on the magnitude of δ. The typical goal is to solve an associated optimization
problem, a prototypical example of which is the following
argmax
δ
L(f(x+ δ;θ), y) s.t. ‖δ‖p ≤ , (1)
where L(·) is the adversary’s utility function (for example, the adversary may wish to maximize
the cross-entropy loss). While a host of such digital attacks have been proposed, two have come to
be viewed as state of the art: the attack developed by Carlini & Wagner (2017b), and the projected
gradient descent attack (PGD) by Madry et al. (2018).
While most of the work to date has been on attacks which modify the digital image directly, we
focus on a class of physical attacks which entail modifying the actual object being photographed
in order to fool the neural network that subsequently takes its digital representation as input. The
attacks we will focus on will have three characteristics:
1. The attack can be implemented in the physical space (e.g., modifying the stop sign);
2. the attack has low suspiciousness; this is operationalized by modifying only a small part of
the object, with the modification similar to common “noise” that obtains in the real world;
for example, stickers on a stop sign would appear to most people as vandalism, but covering
the stop sign with a printed poster would look highly suspicious; and
3. the attack causes misclassification by state-of-the-art deep neural network for the relevant
domain.
2
Since our ultimate purpose is defense, we will not concern ourselves with the issue of actually
implementing the physical attacks. Instead, we will consider the digital representation of these
attacks, ignoring other important issues, such as robustness to many viewpoints and printability.
For example, in the case where the attack involves posting stickers on a stop sign, we will only be
concerned with simulating such stickers on digital images of stop signs. For this reason, we refer
to such attacks physically realizable attacks, to allude to the fact that it is possible to realize them
in practice. It is evident that physically realizable attacks represent a somewhat stronger adversarial
model than their actual implementation in the physical space. Henceforth, for simplicity, we will
use the terms physical attacks and physically realizable attacks interchangeably.
(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) An example of the eyeglass frame attack. Left: original face input image. Middle:
modified input image (adversarial eyeglasses superimposed on the face). Right: an image of the
predicted individual with the adversarial input in the middle image. (b) An example of the stop sign
attack. Left: original stop sign input image. Middle: adversarial mask. Right: stop sign image with
adversarial stickers, classified as a speed limit sign.
We consider three physically realizable attacks. The first is the attack on face recognition by Sharif
et al. (2016), in which the attacker adds adversarial noise inside printed eyeglass frames that can
subsequently be put on to fool the deep neural network (Figure 1a). The second attack posts adver-
sarially crafted stickers on a stop sign to cause it to be misclassified as another road sign, such as
the speed limit sign (Figure 1b) (Eykholt et al., 2018). The third, adversarial patch, attack designs
a patch (a sticker) with adversarial noise that can be placed onto an arbitrary object, causing that
object to be misclassified by a deep neural network (Brown et al., 2018).
2.2 ADVERSARIALLY ROBUST DEEP LEARNING
While numerous approaches have been proposed for making deep learning robust, many are heuristic
and have soon after been defeated by more sophisticated attacks (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b; He
et al., 2017; Carlini & Wagner, 2017a; Athalye et al., 2018a). Consequently, we focus on principled
approaches for defense that have not been broken. These fall broadly into two categories: robust
learning and randomized smoothing. We focus on a state-of-the-art representative from each class.
Robust Learning The goal of robust learning is to minimize a robust loss, defined as follows:
θ∗ = argmin
θ
E
(x,y)∼D
[
max
‖δ‖p≤
L(f(x+ δ;θ), y)
]
, (2)
where D denotes the training data set. In itself this is a highly intractable problem. Several tech-
niques have been developed to obtain approximate solutions. Among the most effective in practice
is the adversarial training approach by Madry et al. (2018), who use the PGD attack as an approx-
imation to the inner optimization problem, and then take gradient descent steps with respect to the
associated adversarial inputs. In addition, we consider a modified version of this approach termed
curriculum adversarial training (Cai et al., 2018). Our implementatio of this approach proceeds as
follows: first, apply adversarial training for a small , then increase  and repeat adversarial training,
and so on, increasing  until we reach the desired level of adversarial noise we wish to be robust to.
Randomized Smoothing The second class of techniques we consider works by adding noise to
inputs at both training and prediction time. The key idea is to construct a smoothed classifier g(·)
from a base classifier f(·) by perturbing the input x with isotropic Gaussian noise with variance σ.
The prediction is then made by choosing a class with the highest probability measure with respect
to the induced distribution of f(·) decisions:
g(x) = argmax
c
P (f(x+ σ) = c), σ ∼ N (0, σ2I) . (3)
3
To achieve provably robust classification in this manner one typically trains the classifier f(·) by
adding Gaussian noise to inputs at training time (Lecuyer et al., 2019; Cohen et al., 2019).
3 ROBUSTNESS OF CONVENTIONAL ROBUST ML METHODS AGAINST
PHYSICAL ATTACKS
Most of the approaches for endowing deep learning with adversarial robustness focus on adversarial
models in which the attacker introduces lp-bounded adversarial perturbations over the entire input.
Earlier we described two representative approaches in this vein: adversarial training, commonly
focused on robustness against l∞ attacks, and randomized smoothing, which is most effective against
l2 attacks (although certification bounds can be extended to other lp norms as well). We call these
methods conventional robust ML.
In this section, we ask the following question:
Are conventional robust ML methods robust against physically realizable attacks?
Conceptually, a similar question was asked in the context of malware classifier evasion by Tong
et al. (2019), who found that lp-based robust ML methods can indeed be successful in achieving
robustness against realizable evasion attacks. Ours is the first investigation of this issue in computer
vision applications and for deep neural networks.
We study this issue experimentally by considering two state-of-the-art approaches for robust ML:
adversarial training a-la-Madry et al. (2018), along with its curriculum learning variation Cai et al.
(2018), and randomized smoothing, using the implementation by Cohen et al. (2019). These ap-
proaches are applied to defend against two physically realizable attacks described in Section 2.1:
an attack on face recognition which adds adversarial eyeglass frames to faces (Sharif et al., 2016),
and an attack on stop sign classification which adds adversarial stickers to a stop sign to cause
misclassification (Eykholt et al., 2018).
We consider several variations of adversarial training, as a function of the l∞ bound, , imposed
on the adversary. Just as Madry et al. (2018), adversarial instances in adversarial training were
generated using PGD. We consider attacks with  ∈ {4, 8} (adversarial training failed to make
progress when we used  = 16). For curriculum adversarial training, we first performed adversarial
training with  = 4, then doubled  to 8 and repeated adversarial training with the model robust to
 = 4, then doubled  again, and so on. In the end, we learned models for  ∈ {4, 8, 16, 32}. For
all versions of adversarial training, we consider 7 and 50 iterations of the PGD attack. We used the
learning rate of /4 for the former and 1/255 for the latter. In all cases, retraining was performed
for 30 epochs using the ADAM optimizer.
For randomized smoothing, we consider noise levels σ ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 1} as in Cohen et al. (2019),
and take 1000 Monte Carlo samples at test time.
3.1 ADVERSARIAL EYEGLASSES IN FACE RECOGNITION
We applied white-box dodging (untargeted) attacks on the face recognition systems (FRS) from
Sharif et al. (2016). We used both the VGGFace data and transfered VGGFace CNN model for
the face recognition task, subselecting 10 individuals, with 300-500 face images for each. Further
details about the dataset, CNN architecture, and training procedure are in Appendix A. For the
attack, we used identical frames as in Sharif et al. (2016) occupying 6.5% of the pixels. Just as Sharif
et al. (2016), we compute attacks (that is, adversarial perturbations inside the eyeglass frame area)
by using the learning rate 20/255 as well as momentum value 0.4, and vary the number of attack
iterations between 0 (no attack) and 300.
Figure 2 presents the results of classifiers obtained from adversarial training (left) as well as curricu-
lum adversarial training (middle), in terms of accuracy (after attack) as a function of the number of
iterations of the Sharif et al. (2016) eyeglass frame attack. First, it is clear that none of the varia-
tions of adversarial training are particularly effective once the number of physical attack iterations is
above 20. The best performance in terms of adversarial robustness is achieved by adversarial train-
ing with  = 8, for approaches using either 7 or 50 PGD iterations (the difference between these
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Figure 2: Performance of adversarial training (left), curriculum adversarial training (with 7 PGD
iterations) (middle), and randomized smoothing (right) against the eyeglass frame attack.
appears negligible). However, non-adversarial accuracy for these models is below 70%, a ∼20%
drop in accuracy compared to the original model. Moreover, adversarial accuracy is under 40% for
sufficiently strong physical attacks. Curriculum adversarial training generally achieves significantly
higher non-adversarial accuracy, but is far less robust, even when trained with PGD attacks that use
 = 32.
Figure 2 (right) shows the performance of randomized smoothing when faced with the eyeglass
frames attack. It is readily apparent that randomized smoothing is ineffective at deflecting this
physical attack: even as we vary the amount of noise we add, accuracy after attacks is below 20%
even for relatively weak attacks, and often drops to nearly 0 for sufficiently strong attacks.
3.2 ADVERSARIAL STICKERS ON STOP SIGNS
Following Eykholt et al. (2018), we use the LISA traffic sign dataset for our experiments, and 40
stop signs from this dataset as our test data and perform untargeted attacks (this is in contrast to the
original work, which is focused on targeted attacks). For the detailed description of the data and the
CNN used for traffic sign prediction, see Appendix A. We apply the same settings as in the original
attacks and use ADAM optimizer with the same parameters. Since we observed few differences
in performance between running PGD for 7 vs. 50 iterations, adversarial training methods in this
section all use 7 iterations of PGD.
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Figure 3: Performance of adversarial training (left), curriculum adversarial training (with 7 PGD
iterations) (middle), and randomized smoothing (right) against the stop sign attack.
Again, we begin by considering adversarial training (Figure 3, left and middle). In this case, both
the original and curriculum versions of adversarial training with PGD are ineffective when  = 32
(error rates on clean data are above 90%); these are consequently omitted from the plots. Curriculum
adversarial training with  = 16 has the best performance on adversarial data, and works well on
clean data. Surprisingly, most variants of adversarial training perform at best marginally better than
the original model against the stop sign attack. Even the best variant has relatively poor performance,
with robust accuracy under 50% for stronger attacks.
Figure 3 (right) presents the results for randomized smoothing. In this set of experiments, we found
that randomized smoothing performs inconsistently. To address this, we used 5 random seeds to
repeat the experiments, and use the resulting mean values in the final results. Here, the best variant
uses σ = 0.25, and, unlike experiments with the eyeglass frame attack, significantly outperforms
adversarial training, reaching accuracy slightly above 60% even for the stronger attacks. Neverthe-
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less, even randomized smoothing results in a significant degradation of effectiveness on adversarial
instances (nearly 40%, compared to clean data).
3.3 DISCUSSION
There are two possible reasons why conventional robust ML perform poorly against physical at-
tacks: 1) adversarial models involving lp-bounded perturbations are too hard to enable effective
robust learning, and 2) the conventional attack model is too much of a mismatch for realistic phys-
ical attacks. In Appendix B, we present evidence supporting the latter. Specifically, we find that
conventional robust ML models exhibit much higher robustness when faced with the lp-bounded
attacks they are trained to be robust to.
4 PROPOSED APPROACH: DEFENSE AGAINST OCCLUSION ATTACKS (DOA)
As we observed in Section 3, conventional models for making deep learning robust to attack can per-
form quite poorly when confronted with physically realizable attacks. In other words, the evidence
strongly suggests that the conventional models of attacks in which attackers can make lp-bounded
perturbations to input images are not particularly useful if one is concerned with the main physical
threats that are likely to be faced in practice. However, given the diversity of possible physical at-
tacks one may perpetrate, is it even possible to have a meaningful approach for ensuring robustness
against a broad range of physical attacks? For example, the two attacks we considered so far couldn’t
be more dissimilar: in one, we engineer eyeglass frames; in another, stickers on a stop sign. We ob-
serve that the key common element in these attacks, and many other physical attacks we may expect
to encounter, is that they involve the introduction of adversarial occlusions to a part of the input.
The common constraint faced in such attacks is to avoid being suspicious, which effectively limits
the size of the adversarial occlusion, but not necessarily its shape or location. Next, we introduce a
simple abstract model of occlusion attacks, and then discuss how such attacks can be computed and
how we can make classifiers robust to them.
4.1 ABSTRACT ATTACK MODEL: RECTANGULAR OCCLUSION ATTACKS (ROA)
We propose the following simple abstract model of adversarial occlusions of input images. The
attacker introduces a fixed-dimension rectangle. This rectangle can be placed by the adversary
anywhere in the image, and the attacker can furthermore introduce l∞ noise inside the rectangle with
an exogenously specified high bound  (for example,  = 255, which effectively allows addition of
arbitrary adversarial noise). This model bears some similarity to l0 attacks, but the rectangle imposes
a contiguity constraint, which reflects common physical limitations. The model is clearly abstract:
in practice, for example, adversarial occlusions need not be rectangular or have fixed dimensions (for
example, the eyeglass frame attack is clearly not rectangular), but at the same time cannot usually
be arbitrarily superimposed on an image, as they are implemented in the physical environment.
Nevertheless, the model reflects some of the most important aspects common to many physical
attacks, such as stickers placed on an adversarially chosen portion of the object we wish to identify.
We call our attack model a rectangular occlusion attack (ROA). An important feature of this attack is
that it is untargeted: since our ultimate goal is to defend against physical attacks, untargeted attacks
that aim to maximize error are the most useful. For illustrations of the ROA attack, see Appendix C.
4.2 COMPUTING ATTACKS
Aside from considerations of modeling, another advantage of the ROA attack is that it is, in principle,
easier to compute than, say, l∞-bounded attacks, since fine-grained adversarial perturbations are
restricted to a small region, and we only need to find a single place for this region in an image. The
latter task, indeed, can be done by an exhaustive search: consider all possible locations for the upper
left-hand corner of the rectangle, compute adversarial noise inside the rectangle using PGD for each
of these, and choose the worst-case attack (i.e., the attack which maximizes loss computed on the
resulting image). However, this approach would be extremely slow, since we need to perform PGD
inside the rectangle for every possible position. Our approach, consequently, decouples these two
tasks. Specifically, we first perform an exhaustive search using a grey rectangle to find a position for
it that maximizes loss, and then fix the position and apply PGD inside the rectangle.
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An important limitation of the exhaustive search approach for ROA location is that it necessitates
computations of the loss function for every possible location, which itself requires full forward
propagation each time. Thus, the search itself is still relatively slow. To speed the process up
further, we use the gradient of the input image to identify candidate locations. Specifically, we
select a subset of C locations for the sticker with the highest magnitude of the gradient, and only
exhaustively search among these C locations. C is exogenously specified to be small relative to the
number of pixels in the image, which significantly limits the number of loss function evaluations.
Full details of our algorithms for computing ROA are provided in Appendix D.
4.3 DEFENDING AGAINST ROA
Once we are able to compute the ROA attack, we apply the standard adversarial training approach
for defense. We term the resulting classifiers robust to our abstract adversarial occlusion attacks
Defense against Occlusion Attacks (DOA), and propose these as an alternative to conventional robust
ML for defending against physical attacks. As we will see presently, this defense against ROA is
quite adequate for our purposes.
5 EFFECTIVENESS OF DOA AGAINST PHYSICALLY REALIZABLE ATTACKS
We now evaluate the effectiveness of DOA—that is, adversarial training using the ROA threat model
we introduced—against physically realizable attacks (see Appendix G for some examples that defeat
conventional methods but not DOA). Recall that we consider only digital representations of the cor-
responding physical attacks. Consequently, we can view our results in this section as a lower bound
on robustness to actual physical attacks, which have to deal with additional practical constraints,
such as being robust to multiple viewpoints. In addition to the two physical attacks we previously
considered, we also evaluate DOA against the adversarial patch attack, implemented on both face
recognition and traffic sign data.
5.1 DOA AGAINST ADVERSARIAL EYEGLASSES
We consider two rectangle dimensions resulting in comparable area: 100 × 50 and 70 × 70, both
in pixels. Thus, the rectangles occupy approximately 10% of the 224 × 224 face images. We used
{30, 50} iterations of PGD with  = 255/2 to generate adversarial noise inside the rectangle, and
with learning rate α = {8, 4} correspondingly. For the gradient version of ROA, we chooseC = 30.
DOA adversarial training is performed for 5 epochs with a learning rate of 0.0001.
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Figure 4: Performance of DOA (using the 100 × 50 rectangle) against the eyeglass frame attack in
comparison with conventional methods. Left: comparison between DOA, adversarial training, and
randomized smoothing (using the most robust variants of these). Middle/Right: Comparing DOA
performance for different rectangle dimensions and numbers of PGD iterations inside the rectangle.
Middle: using exhaustive search for ROA; right: using the gradient-based heuristic for ROA.
Figure 4 (left) presents the results comparing the effectiveness of DOA against the eyeglass frame
attack on face recognition to adversarial training and randomized smoothing (we took the most
robust variants of both of these). We can see that DOA yields significantly more robust classifiers for
this domain. The gradient-based heuristic does come at some cost, with performance slightly worse
than when we use exhaustive search, but this performance drop is relatively small, and the result is
still far better than conventional robust ML approaches. Figure 4 (middle and right) compares the
performance of DOA between two rectangle variants with different dimensions. The key observation
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is that as long as we use enough iterations of PGD inside the rectangle, changing its dimensions
(keeping the area roughly constant) appears to have minimal impact.
5.2 DOA AGAINST THE STOP SIGN ATTACK
We now repeat the evaluation with the traffic sign data and the stop sign attack. In this case, we used
10× 5 and 7× 7 rectangles covering ∼5 % of the 32× 32 images. We set C = 10 for the gradient-
based ROA. Implementation of DOA is otherwise identical as in the face recognition experiments
above.
We present our results using the square rectangle, which in this case was significantly more effec-
tive; the results for the 10 × 5 rectangle DOA attacks are in Appendix F. Figure 5 (left) compares
the effectiveness of DOA against the stop sign attack on traffic sign data with the best variants of
adversarial training and randomized smoothing. Our results here are for 30 iterations of PGD; in Ap-
pendix F, we study the impact of varying the number of PGD iterations. We can observe that DOA
is again significantly more robust, with robust accuracy over 90% for the exhaustive search variant,
and ∼85% for the gradient-based variant, even for stronger attacks. Moreover, DOA remains 100%
effective at classifying stop signs on clean data, and exhibits ∼95% accuracy on the full traffic sign
classification task.
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Figure 5: Performance of the best case of adversarial training, randomized smoothing, and DOA
against the stop sign attack (left) and adversarial patch attack (right).
5.3 DOA AGAINST ADVERSARIAL PATCH ATTACKS
Finally, we evaluate DOA against the adversarial patch attacks. In these attacks, an adversarial patch
(e.g., sticker) is designed to be placed on an object with the goal of inducing a target prediction. We
study this in both face recognition and traffic sign classification tasks. Here, we present the results
for face recognition; further detailed results on both datasets are provided in Appendix F.
As we can see from Figure 5 (right), adversarial patch attacks are quite effective once the attack
region (fraction of the image) is 10% or higher, with adversarial training and randomized smoothing
both performing rather poorly. In contrast, DOA remains highly robust even when the adversarial
patch covers 20% of the image.
6 CONCLUSION
As we have shown, conventional methods for making deep learning approaches for image classi-
fication robust to physically realizable attacks tend to be relatively ineffective. In contrast, a new
threat model we proposed, rectangular occlusion attacks (ROA), coupled with adversarial training,
achieves high robustness against several prominent examples of physical attacks. While we explored
a number of variations of ROA attacks as a means to achieving robustness against physical attacks,
numerous questions remain. For example, can we develop effective methods to certify robustness
against ROA, and are the resulting approaches as effective in practice as our method based on a
combination of heuristically computed attacks and adversarial training? Are there other types of
occlusions that are more effective? Answers to these and related questions may prove a promising
path towards practical robustness of deep learning when deployed for downstream applications of
computer vision such as autonomous driving and face recognition.
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A DESCRIPTION OF DATASETS AND DEEP LEARNING CLASSIFIERS
A.1 FACE RECOGNITION
The VGGFace dataset1 (Parkhi et al., 2015) is a benchmark for face recognition, containing 2622
subjusts with 2.6 million images in total. We chose ten subjects: A. J. Buckley, A. R. Rahman,
Aamir Khan, Aaron Staton, Aaron Tveit, Aaron Yoo, Abbie Cornish, Abel Ferrara, Abigail Bres-
lin, and Abigail Spencer, and subselected face images pertaining only to these individuals. Since
approximately half of the images cannot be downloaded, our final dataset contains 300-500 images
for each subject.
We used the standard corp-and-resize method to process the data to be 224 × 224 pixels, and split
the dataset into training, validation, and test according to a 7:2:1 ratio for each subject. In total, the
data set has 3178 images in the training set, 922 images in the validation set, and 470 images in the
test set.
We use the VGGFace convolutional neural network (Parkhi et al., 2015) model, a variant of the
VGG16 model containing 5 convolutional layer blocks and 3 fully connected layers. We make use of
standard transfer learning as we only classify 10 subjects, keeping the convolutional layers as same
as VGGFace structure,2 but changing the fully connected layer to be 1024 → 1024 →10 instead
of 4096→ 4096→2622. Specifically, in our Pytorch implementation, we convert the images from
RGB to BGR channel orders and subtract the mean value [129.1863, 104.7624, 93.5940] in order to
use the pretrained weights from VGG-Face on convolutional layers. We set the batch size to be 64
and use Pytorch built-in Adam Optimizer with initial learning rate of 10−4 and default parameters
in Pytorch.3 We drop the learning rate by 0.1 every 10 epochs. Additionally, we used validation set
accuracy to keep track of model performance and choose a model in case of overfitting. After 30
epochs of training, the model successfully obtains 99.36 % on test data.
A.2 TRAFFIC SIGN CLASSIFICATION
To be consistent with (Eykholt et al., 2018), we select the subset of LISA which contains 47 different
U.S. traffic signs (Møgelmose et al., 2012). To alleviate the problem of imbalance and extremely
blurry data, we picked 16 best quality signs with 3509 training and 1148 validation data points. From
the validation data, we obtain the test data that includes only 40 stop signs to evaluate performance
with respect to the stop sign attack, as done by Eykholt et al. (2018). In the main body of the paper,
we present results only on this test data to evaluate robustness to stop sign attacks. In the appendix
below, we also include performance on the full validation set without adversarial manipulation.
All the data was processed by standard crop-and-resize to 32× 32 pixels. We use the LISA-CNN ar-
chitecture defined in (Eykholt et al., 2018), and construct a convolutional neural network containing
three convolutional layers and one fully connected layer. We use the Adam Optimizer with initial
learning rate of 10−1 and default parameters 3, dropping the learning rate by 0.1 every 10 epochs.
We set the batch size to be 128. After 30 epochs, we achieve the 98.34 % accuracy on the validation
set, and 100% accuracy in identifying the stop signs in our test data.
1http://www.robots.ox.ac.uk/˜vgg/data/vgg_face/.
2Code that we use for transfering VGG-Face to Pytorch Framework is available at https://github.
com/prlz77/vgg-face.pytorch
3Default Pytorch Adam parameters stand for β1=0.9, β1=0.999 and =10−8
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B EFFECTIVENESS OF CONVENTIONAL ROBUST ML METHODS AGAINST l∞
AND l2 ATTACKS
In this appendix we show that adversarial training and randomized smoothing degrade more grace-
fully when faced with attacks that they are designed for. In particular, we consider here variants of
projected gradient descent (PGD) for both the l∞ and l2 attacks Madry et al. (2018). In particular,
the form of PGD for the l∞ attack is
xt+1 = Proj(xt + αsgn(∇L(xt; θ))),
where Proj is a projection operator which clips the result to be feasible, xt the adversarial example
in iteration t, α the learning rate, andL(·) the loss function. In the case of an l2 attack, PGD becomes
xt+1 = Proj
(
xt + α
∇L(xt; θ)
‖∇L(xt; θ)‖2
)
,
where the projection operator normalizes the perturbation δ = xt+1 − xt to have ‖δ‖2 ≤  if it
doesn’t already Kolter & Madry (2019).
The experiments were done on the face recognition and traffic sign datasets, but unlike physical
attacks on stop signs, we now consider adversarial perturbations to all sign images.
B.1 FACE RECOGNITION
Table 1: Curriculum Adversarial Training against 7 Iterations L∞ Attacks on Face Recognition
Attack Strength
 = 0  = 2/255  = 4/255  = 8/255  = 16/255
Clean Model 98.94% 57.87% 13.62% 0% 0%
CAdv. Training:  = 4/255 97.45% 94.68% 87.02% 65.11% 17.23%
CAdv. Training:  = 8/255 96.17% 93.40% 89.36% 75.53% 31.49%
CAdv. Training:  = 16/255 90.64% 88.09% 84.04% 75.96% 45.74%
CAdv. Training:  = 32/255 80.85% 76.60% 74.04% 65.10% 47.87%
Table 2: Curriculum Adversarial Training against 20 Iterations L∞ Attacks on Face Recognition
Attack Strength
 = 0  = 2/255  = 4/255  = 8/255  = 16/255
Clean Model 98.94% 44.04% 1.70% 0% 0%
CAdv. Training:  = 4/255 97.45% 94.68% 85.74% 46.60% 5.11%
CAdv. Training:  = 8/255 96.17% 93.19% 88.94% 69.36% 9.57%
CAdv. Training:  = 16/255 90.64% 88.08% 83.83% 73.62% 35.96%
CAdv. Training:  = 32/255 80.85% 76.17% 74.04% 63.82% 43.62%
We begin with our results on the face recognition dataset. Tables 1 and 2 present results for (cur-
riculum) adversarial training for varying  of the l∞ attacks, separately for training and evaluation.
As we can see, curriculum adversarial training with  = 16/255 is generally the most robust, and
remains reasonably effective for relatively large perturbations. However, we do observe a clear
tradeoff between accuracy on non-adversarial data and robustness, as one would expect.
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Table 3: Randomized Smoothing against 20 Iterations L2 Attacks on Face Recognition
Attack Strength
 = 0  = 0.5  = 1  = 1.5  = 2  = 2.5  = 3
Clean Model 98.94% 93.19% 70.85% 44.68% 22.13% 8.29% 3.19%
RS: σ = 0.25 98.51% 97.23% 95.53% 91.70% 81.06% 67.87% 52.97%
RS: σ = 0.5 97.65% 94.25% 93.61% 91.70% 87.87% 82.55% 71.70%
RS: σ = 1 92.97% 93.19% 91.70% 91.06% 88.51% 85.53% 82.98%
Table 3 presents the results of using randomized smoothing on face recognition data, when facing
the l2 attacks. Again, we observe a high level of robustenss and, in most cases, relatively limited
drop in performance, with σ = 0.5 perhaps striking the best balance.
B.2 TRAFFIC SIGN CLASSIFICATION
Table 4: Curriculum Adversarial Training against 7 Iterations L∞ Attacks on Traffic Signs
Attack Strength
 = 0  = 2/255  = 4/255  = 8/255  = 16/255
Clean Model 98.69% 90.24% 65.24% 33.80% 10.10%
CAdv. Training:  = 4/255 99.13% 97.13% 93.47% 63.85% 20.73%
CAdv. Training:  = 8/255 98.72% 96.86% 93.90% 81.70% 38.24%
CAdv. Training:  = 16/255 96.95% 95.03% 92.77% 87.63% 64.02%
CAdv. Training:  = 32/255 65.63% 53.83% 50.87% 46.69% 38.07%
Table 5: Curriculum Adversarial Training against 20 Iterations L∞ Attacks on Traffic Signs
Attack Strength
 = 0  = 2/255  = 4/255  = 8/255  = 16/255
Clean Model 98.69% 89.54% 61.58% 24.65% 5.14%
CAdv. Training:  = 4/255 99.13% 96.95% 91.90% 56.53% 12.02%
CAdv. Training:  = 8/255 98.72% 96.68% 93.64% 76.22% 28.13%
CAdv. Training:  = 16/255 96.95% 95.03% 92.51% 86.76% 54.01%
CAdv. Training:  = 32/255 65.63% 53.83% 50.78% 46.08% 36.49%
Tables 4 and 5 present evaluation on traffic sign data for curriculum adversarial training against the
l∞ attack for varying . As with face recognition data, we can observe that the approaches tend
to be relatively robust, and effective on non-adversarial data for adversarial training methods using
 < 32/255.
Table 6: Randomized Smoothing against 20 Iterations L2 Attacks on Traffic Signs
Attack Strength
 = 0  = 0.5  = 1  = 1.5  = 2  = 2.5  = 3
Clean Model 98.69% 61.67% 25.78% 11.50% 7.84% 4.97% 3.57%
RS: σ = 0.25 98.22% 89.08% 55.69% 34.06% 23.46% 18.61% 14.75%
RS: σ = 0.5 96.28% 90.80% 76.13% 52.64% 35.31% 23.43% 16.52%
RS: σ = 1 88.21% 83.68% 75.49% 64.90% 50.03% 36.53% 26.22%
The results of randomized smoothing on traffic sign data are given in Table 6. Since images are
smaller here than in VGGFace, lower values of  for the l2 attacks are meaningful, and for  ≤ 1 we
generally see robust performance on randomized smoothing, with σ = 0.5 providing a good balance
between non-adversarial accuracy and robustness, just as before.
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C EXAMPLES OF ROA
(a) (b)
Figure 6: Examples of the ROA attack on face recognition, using a rectangle of size 100 × 50. (a)
Left: the original A. J. Buckley’s image. Middle: modified input image (ROA superimposed on the
face). Right: an image of the predicted individual who is Aaron Tveit with the adversarial input in
the middle image. (b) Left: the original Abigail Spencer’s image. Middle: modified input image
(ROA superimposed on the face). Right: an image of the predicted individual who is Aaron Yoo
with the adversarial input in the middle image.
Figure 6 provides several examples of the ROA attack in the context of face recognition. Note that
in these examples, the adversaries choose to occlude the noise/upper lip and eye areas of the image,
and, indeed, this makes the face more challenging to recognize even to a human observer.
(a) (b)
Figure 7: Examples of the ROA attack on traffic sign, using a rectangle of size 7 × 7. (a) Left: the
original Speedlimit45 sign. Middle: modified input image (ROA superimposed on the sign). Right:
an image of the predicted which is Speedlimit30 with the adversarial input in the middle image. (b)
Left: the original Stop sign. Middle: modified input image (ROA superimposed on the sign). Right:
an image of the predicted Yield sign with the adversarial input in the middle image.
D DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE ALGORITHMS FOR COMPUTING THE
RECTANGULAR OCCLUSION ATTACKS
Our basic algorithm for computing rectangular occlusion attacks (ROA) proceeds through the fol-
lowing two steps:
1. Iterate through possible positions for the rectangle’s upper left-hand corner point in the
image. Find the position for a grey rectangle (RGB value =[127.5,127.5,127.5]) in the
image that maximizes loss.
2. Generate high- l∞ noise inside the rectangle at the position computed in step 1.
Algorithm 1 presents the full algorithm for identifying the ROA position, which amounts to exhaus-
tive search through the image pixel region. This algorithm has several parameters. First, we assume
that images are squares with dimensions N2. Second, we introduce a stride parameter S. The pur-
pose of this parameter is to make location computation faster by only considering every other Sth
pixel during the search (in other words, we skip S pixels each time). For our implementation of
ROA attacks, we choose the stride parameter S = 5 for face recognition and S = 2 for traffic sign
classification.
Despite introducing the tunable stride parameter, the search for the best location for ROA still entails
a large number of loss function evaluations, which are somewhat costly (since each such evaluation
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Algorithm 1 Computation of ROA position using exhaustive search.
Input:
Data: Xi, yi; Test data shape: N ×N ; Target model parameters: θ; Stride: S ;
Output:
ROA Position: (j′, k′)
1.function ExhaustiveSearching(Model,Xi, yi, N, S)
2. for j in range(N/S) do:
3. for k in range(N/S) do:
4. Generate the adversarial Xadvi image by:
5. place a grey rectangle onto the image with top-left corner at (j × S, k × S);
6. if L(Xadvi , yi, θ) is higher than previous loss:
7. Update (j′, k′) = (j, k)
8. end for
9. end for
10. return (j′, k′)
Algorithm 2 Computation of ROA position using gradient-based search.
Input:
Data: Xi, yi; Test data shape: N ×N ; Target Model: θ; Stride: S ;
Number of Potential Candidates: C;
Output:
Best Sticker Position: (j′, k′)
1.function GradientBasedSearch(Xi, yi, N, S,C, θ)
2. Calculate the gradient∇L of Loss(Xi, yi, θ) w.r.t. Xi
3. J,K = HelperSearching(∇L,N, S,C)
4. for j, k in J,K do:
5. Generate the adversarial Xadvi image by:
6. put the sticker on the image where top-left corner at (j × S, k × S);
7. if Loss(Xadvi , yi, θ) is higher than previous loss:
8. Update (j′, k′) = (j, k)
9. end for
10. return (j′, k′)
1.function HelperSearching(∇L,N, S,C)
2. for j in range(N/S) do:
3. for k in range(N/S) do:
4. Calculate the Sensitivity value L =
∑
i∈rectangle(∇Li)2 where top-left corner at (j ×
S, k × S);
6. if the Sensitivity value L is in top C of previous values:
7. Put (j, k) in J,K and discard (js, ks) with lowest L
8. end for
9. end for
10. return J,K
means a full forward pass through the deep neural network), and these costs add up quickly. To speed
things up, we consider using the magnitude of the gradient of the loss as a measure of sensitivity
of particular regions to manipulation. Specifically, suppose that we compute a gradient ∇L, and let
∇Li be the gradient value for a particular pixel i in the image. Now, we can iterate over the possible
ROA locations, but for each location compute the gradient of the loss at that location corresponding
to the rectangular region. We do this by adding squared gradient values (∇Li)2 over pixels i in the
rectangle. We use this approach to find the top C candidate locations for the rectangle. Finally, we
consider each of these, computing the actual loss for each location, to find the position of ROA. The
full algorithm is provided as Algorithm 2.
Once we’ve found the place for the rectangle, our next step is to introduce adversarial noise inside
it. For this, we use the l∞ version of the PGD attack, restricting perturbations to the rectangle.
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Original image Grad. plot Grad. searching Exh. searching
Figure 8: Examples of the different search techniques. From left to right: 1) the original input image,
2) the plot of input gradient, 3) face with ROA location identified using gradient-based search, 4)
face with ROA location identified using exhaustive search. Each row is a different example.
Figure 8 offers a visual illustration of how gradient-based search compares to exhaustive search for
computing ROA.
E DETAILS OF PHYSICALLY REALIZABLE ATTACKS
Physically realizable attacks that we study have a common feature: first, they specify a mask, which
is typically precomputed, and subsequently introduce adversarial noise inside the mask area. Let M
denote the mask matrix constraining the area of the perturbation δ; M has the same dimensions as
the input image and contains 0s where no perturbation is allowed, and 1s in the area which can be
purturbed. The physically realizable attacks we consider then solve an optimization problem of the
following form:
argmax
δ
L(f(x+Mδ;θ), y). (4)
Next, we describe the details of the three physical attacks we consider in the main paper.
E.1 EYEGLASS FRAME ATTACKS ON FACE RECOGNITION
Following Sharif et al. (2016), we first initialized the eyeglass frame with 5 different colors, and
chose the best starting color by calculating the cross entropy loss. For each update step, we divided
the gradient value by the its maximum value before multiplying by the learning rate which is 20/255.
Then we only kept the gradient value of eyeglass frame area. Finally, we clipped and rounded the
pixel value to keep it in the valid range.
E.2 STICKER ATTACKS ON STOP SIGNS
Following Eykholt et al. (2018), we initialized the stickers on the stop signs with random noise. For
each update step, we used the Adam optimizer with 0.1 learning rate and with default parameters.
Just as for other attacks, adversarial perturbations were restricted to the mask area exogenously spec-
ified; in our case, we used the same mask as Eykholt et al. (2018)—a collection of small rectangles.
E.3 ADVERSARIAL PATCH ATTACK
We used gradient ascent to maximize the log probability of the targeted class P [ytarget|x], as in the
original paper (Brown et al., 2018). When implementing the adversarial patch, we used a square
patch rather than the circular patch in the original paper; we don’t anticipate this choice to be prac-
tically consequential. We randomly chose the position and direction of the patch, used the learning
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rate of 5/255, and fixed the number of attack iterations to 100 for each image. We varied the attack
region (mask) R ∈ {0%, 5%, 10%0%, 15%, 20%, 25%}.
For the face recognition dataset, we used 27 images (9 classes (without targeted class) × 3 images
in each class) to design the patch, and then ran the attack over 20 epochs. For the smaller traffic sign
dataset, we used 15 images (15 classes (without targeted class) × 1 image in each class) to design
the patch, and then ran the attack over 5 epochs. Note that when evaluating the adversarial patch,
we used the validation set without the targeted class images.
F ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS WITH DOA
F.1 FACE RECOGNITION AND EYEGLASS FRAME ATTACK
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Figure 9: Effectiveness of DOA using the gradient-based method and the 100 × 50 region against
the eyeglass frame attack, varying the number of PGD iterations for adversarial perturbations inside
the rectangle. Left: using exhaustive search. Right: using gradient-based search.
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Figure 10: Effectiveness of DOA using the gradient-based method and the 70 × 70 region against
the eyeglass frame attack, varying the number of PGD iterations for adversarial perturbations inside
the rectangle. Left: using exhaustive search. Right: using gradient-based search.
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F.2 TRAFFIC SIGN CLASSIFICATION AND THE STOP SIGN ATTACK
Table 7: Comparison of effectiveness of different approaches against the stop sign attack. Best
parameter choices were made for each.
Attack Iterations
Validation Set 0 101 102 103
Clean Model 98.69% 100% 42.5% 32.5% 25%
CAdv. Training:  = 16/255 96.95% 97.5% 57.5% 45% 42.5%
Randomized Smoothing: σ = 0.25 98.22% 100% 70% 64.5% 62.5%
DOA (exhaustive; 7 × 7; 30 PGD iterations) 92.51% 100% 92% 92% 90.5%
DOA (gradient-based; 7 × 7; 30 PGD iterations) 95.82% 100% 85% 85.5% 84%
Table 8: Effectiveness of 10 × 5 DOA using exhaustive search with different numbers of PGD
iterations against the stop sign attack.
Attack Iterations
Validation Set 0 101 102 103
Clean Model 98.69% 100% 42.5% 32.5% 25%
Exhaustive Search with 7 PGD 96.50% 100% 73% 70.5% 71%
Exhaustive Search with 20 PGD 95.86% 100% 86% 85% 85%
Exhaustive Search with 30 PGD 95.59% 100% 86.5% 84% 82.5%
Exhaustive Search with 50 PGD 95.87% 100% 77% 76.5% 73.5%
Table 9: Effectiveness of 10 × 5 gradient-based DOA with different numbers of PGD iterations
against the stop sign attack.
Attack Iterations
Validation Set 0 101 102 103
Clean Model 98.69% 100% 42.5% 32.5% 25%
Gradient Based Search with 7 PGD 97.53% 100% 83.5% 78% 78%
Gradient Based Search with 20 PGD 97.11% 100% 82.5% 81.5% 80.5%
Gradient Based Search with 30 PGD 96.83% 100% 83.5% 79.5% 81%
Gradient Based Search with 50 PGD 96.46% 100% 82.5% 82.5% 81.5%
Table 10: Effectiveness of 7 × 7 DOA using exhaustive search with different numbers of PGD
iterations against the stop sign attack.
Attack Iterations
Validation Set 0 101 102 103
Clean Model 98.69% 100% 42.5% 32.5% 25%
Exhaustive Search with 7 PGD 94.16% 100% 86.5% 85% 85%
Exhaustive Search with 20 PGD 92.74% 100% 83% 80% 79%
Exhaustive Search with 30 PGD 92.51% 100% 92% 92% 90.5%
Exhaustive Search with 50 PGD 92.94% 100% 89.5% 89% 88.5%
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Table 11: Effectiveness of 7 × 7 gradient-based DOA with different numbers of PGD iterations
against the stop sign attack.
Attack Iterations
Validation Set 0 101 102 103
Clean Model 98.69% 100% 42.5% 32.5% 25%
Gradient Based Search with 7 PGD 96.52% 100% 81.5% 80% 79.5%
Gradient Based Search with 20 PGD 95.51% 100% 83.5% 82.5% 83%
Gradient Based Search with 30 PGD 95.82% 100% 85% 85.5% 84%
Gradient Based Search with 50 PGD 95.59% 100% 81% 81% 81.5%
F.3 EVALUATION WITH THE ADVERSARIAL PATCH ATTACK
F.3.1 FACE RECOGNITION
Table 12: Comparison of effectiveness of different approaches against the adversarial patch attack
on the face recognition data. Best parameter choices were made for each.
Attacking Region
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Clean Model 99.30% 80.69% 41.21% 19.41% 9.76% 5.75%
CAdv. Training:  = 16/255 94.15% 48.26% 34.38% 28.85% 23.54% 19.02%
Randomized Smoothing: σ = 1 98.83% 61.99% 36.26% 33.80% 24.68% 16.02%
DOA (exhaustive; 100 × 50; 50 PGD iterations) 99.30% 98.72% 97.83% 97.18% 81.24% 24.19%
DOA (exhaustive; 70 × 70; 50 PGD iterations) 99.41% 98.37% 97.29% 96.53% 63.23% 44.14%
Table 13: Effectiveness of adversarial training against the adversarial patch attack on face recogni-
tion data.
Attacking Region
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Clean Model 99.30% 80.69% 41.21% 19.41% 9.76% 5.75%
7 Iterations Adv. Training:  = 4/255 92.28% 57.05% 39.15% 34.71% 10.52% 7.81%
7 Iterations Adv. Training:  = 8/255 66.54% 27.98% 23.54% 21.26% 18.55% 17.03%
50 Iterations Adv. Training:  = 4/255 90.29% 57.38% 53.58% 36.01% 28.85% 16.05%
50 Iterations Adv. Training:  = 8/255 53.68% 21.80% 21.15% 17.79% 17.79% 16.70%
Table 14: Effectiveness of curriculum adversarial training against the adversarial patch attack on
face recognition data.
Attacking Region
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Clean Model 99.30% 80.69% 41.21% 19.41% 9.76% 5.75%
CAdv. Training:  = 4/255 97.89% 52.49% 45.44% 30.91% 16.05% 10.85%
CAdv. Training:  = 8/255 96.84% 44.79% 29.18% 23.86% 12.47% 10.20%
CAdv. Training:  = 16/255 94.15% 48.26% 34.38% 28.85% 23.54% 19.20%
CAdv. Training:  = 32/255 81.05% 42.95% 40.46% 32.00% 20.93% 17.14%
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Table 15: Effectiveness of randomized smoothing against the adversarial patch attack on face recog-
nition data.
Attacking Region
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Clean Model 99.30% 80.69% 41.21% 19.41% 9.76% 5.75%
Randomized Smoothing: σ = 0.25 98.95% 60.35% 26.67% 13.80% 6.67% 5.15%
Randomized Smoothing: σ = 0.5 97.66% 81.05% 58.83% 33.92% 26.55% 14.74%
Randomized Smoothing: σ = 1 98.83% 61.99% 36.26% 33.80% 24.68% 16.02%
Table 16: Effectiveness of DOA against the adversarial patch attack on face recognition data.
Attacking Region
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Clean Model 99.30% 80.69% 41.21% 19.41% 9.76% 5.75%
(100× 50)Exhaustive Search with 50 PGD 99.30% 98.70% 97.83% 97.18% 81.24% 24.19%
(100× 50)Gradient Based Search with 50 PGD 99.53% 98.41% 96.75% 87.42% 57.48% 24.62%
(70× 70)Exhaustive Search with 50 PGD 99.41% 98.37% 97.29% 96.53% 63.23% 44.14%
(70× 70)Gradient Based Search with 50 PGD 98.83% 97.51% 96.31% 93.82% 92.19% 31.34%
F.3.2 TRAFFIC SIGN CLASSIFICATION
Table 17: Comparison of effectiveness of different approaches against the adversarial patch attack
on the traffic sign data. Best parameter choices were made for each.
Attacking Region
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Clean Model 98.38% 75.87% 58.62% 40.68% 33.10% 22.47%
CAdv. Training:  = 16/255 96.77% 86.93% 70.21% 66.11% 51.13% 40.77%
Randomized Smoothing: σ = 0.5 95.39% 83.28% 68.17% 53.86% 48.79% 33.10%
DOA (gradient-based; 7 × 7; 30 PGD iterations) 94.69% 90.68% 88.41% 81.79% 72.30% 58.71%
DOA (gradient-based; 7 × 7; 50 PGD iterations) 94.69% 90.33% 89.29% 78.92% 70.21% 58.54%
Table 18: Effectiveness of adversarial training against the adversarial patch attack on traffic sign
data.
Attacking Region
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Clean Model 98.38% 75.87% 58.62% 40.68% 33.10% 22.47%
Adv. Training:  = 4/255 98.96% 82.14% 64.46% 45.73% 31.36% 23.78%
Adv. Training:  = 8/255 95.62% 76.74% 62.89% 46.60% 37.37% 25.09%
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Table 19: Effectiveness of curriculum adversarial training against the adversarial patch attack on
traffic sign data.
Attacking Region
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Clean Model 98.38% 75.87% 58.62% 40.68% 33.10% 22.47%
CAdv. Training:  = 4/255 98.96% 77.18% 57.32% 39.02% 38.94% 31.10%
CAdv. Training:  = 8/255 98.96% 86.24% 68.64% 60.19% 42.42% 35.10%
CAdv. Training:  = 16/255 96.77% 86.93% 70.21% 66.11% 51.13% 40.77%
CAdv. Training:  = 32/255 63.78% 59.93% 51.57% 45.38% 37.37% 27.79%
Table 20: Effectiveness of randomized smoothing against the adversarial patch attack on traffic sign
data.
Attacking Region
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Clean Model 98.38% 75.87% 58.62% 40.68% 33.10% 22.47%
Randomized Smoothing: σ = 0.25 98.27% 82.24% 66.78% 54.67% 40.37% 33.79%
Randomized Smoothing: σ = 0.5 95.39% 83.28% 68.17% 53.86% 48.79% 33.10%
Randomized Smoothing: σ = 1 85.47% 74.39% 54.44% 45.44% 40.48% 29.06%
Table 21: Effectiveness of DOA (30 PGD iterations) against the adversarial patch attack on traffic
sign data.
Attacking Region
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Clean Model 98.38% 75.87% 58.62% 40.68% 33.10% 22.47%
(10× 5)Exhaustive Search 94.00% 91.46% 86.67% 76.39% 68.12% 55.57%
(10× 5)Gradient Based Search 93.77% 86.67% 80.57% 75.00% 64.90% 54.44%
(7× 7)Exhaustive Search 92.27% 89.02% 82.93% 78.40% 66.90% 55.92%
(7× 7)Gradient Based Search 94.69% 90.68% 88.41% 81.79% 72.30% 58.71%
Table 22: Effectiveness of DOA (50 PGD iterations) against the adversarial patch attack on traffic
sign data.
Attacking Region
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Clean Model 98.38% 75.87% 58.62% 40.68% 33.10% 22.47%
(10× 5)Exhaustive Search 96.42% 93.90% 90.42% 80.66% 67.77% 53.92%
(10× 5)Gradient Based Search 93.54% 90.33% 85.80% 79.79% 69.86% 49.74%
(7× 7)Exhaustive Search 87.08% 82.49% 75.96% 70.99% 60.10% 52.53%
(7× 7)Gradient Based Search 94.69% 90.33% 89.29% 78.92% 70.21% 58.54%
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G EXAMPLES OF PHYSICALLY REALIZABLE ATTACK AGAINST ALL
DEFENSE MODELS
G.1 FACE RECOGNITION
Original image Adv. image Adv. training Rand. smoothing DOA
Aaron Tveit Aaron Tveit A.R. Rahman Aaron Yoo Aaron Tveit
Abigail Cornish Abigail Cornish Abigail Breslin Aaron Tveit Abigail Cornish
Figure 11: Examples of the eyeglass attack on face recognition. From left to right: 1) the original
input image, 2) image with adversarial eyeglass frames, 3) face predicted by a model generated
through adversarial training, 4) face predicted by a model generated through randomized smoothing,
5) face predicted (correctly) by a model generated through DOA. Each row is a separate example.
G.2 TRAFFIC SIGN CLASSIFICATION
Original image Adv. image Adv. training Rand. smoothing DOA
Stop sign Stop sign Added lane Speed limit 35 Stop sign
Stop sign Stop sign Speed limit 35 Speed limit 35 Stop sign
Figure 12: Examples of the stop sign attack. From left to right: 1) the original input image, 2)
image with adversarial eyeglass frames, 3) face predicted by a model generated through adversarial
training, 4) face predicted by a model generated through randomized smoothing, 5) face predicted
(correctly) by a model generated through DOA. Each row is a separate example.
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